Extension of Absolute Immunity to Court-Appointed Counsel, Minns v. Pal, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1977 Issue 1 
January 1977 
Extension of Absolute Immunity to Court-Appointed Counsel, 
Minns v. Pal, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Extension of Absolute Immunity to Court-Appointed Counsel, Minns v. Pal, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), 
1977 WASH. U. L. Q. 155 (1977). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/13 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
EXTENSION OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO COURT-
APPOINTED COUNSEL
Minns v. Pal, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976)
In Minns v. Paul' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit extended to court-appointed defense counsel the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity from section 1983 suits. The defendant at-
torney had been appointed to assist indigent inmates on legal matters
related to their incarceration.2 Plaintiff requested assistance in preparing
a writ of habeas corpus.3 After defendant ignored several requests, 4
plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 alleging that defendant,
while acting under color of state law, had deprived plaintiff of constitu-
tional rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. The district court
held the requisite state action lacking and dismissed the complaint. 7 The
1. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
2. VA. CODE § 53.21.2 (1974).
3. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
4. Id. at 900. Plaintiff requested defendant's assistance on four occasions. It is
not clear from the opinion whether the defendant intentionally disregarded plaintiff's
requests, whether his failure was due to negligence, or whether he had good cause for not
assisting the plaintiff. A period of about forty-two to forty-seven days elapsed between
the plaintiff's initial request and the filing of the complaint in this case.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Plaintiff was seeking a declaratory judgment as well as compensatory and punitive
damages. 542 F.2d at 900. Actual damages do not have to be proven for a plaintiff to
recover under § 1983 because nominal damages are available. For a discussion of
damages, see C. ANTmu, FED RAI. CIVIL RIGITS AcTs § 76 (1971).
6. To maintain an action under § 1983 the plaintiff must show: (1) that he was
deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, (2) that the
defendant deprived or caused the plaintiff to be deprived of such a right, and (3) that the
defendant acted under color of state law or customs. For a discussion of the pleadings
and proof required, see C. ANTIEAu, supra note 5, at § 76. But see Williams v. Eaton,
443 F.2d 422, 429 (10th Cir. 1971).
7. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 900. The district court's position is followed by
a majority of the courts. In Hill v. Lewis, 361 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Ark. 1973) the
court held: "[A] private attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case, whether
Washington University Open Scholarship
156 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1977:155
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on
different grounds and held: Court-appointed defense counsel are abso-
lutely immune from suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8
Section 1983 makes civilly liable every person who, acting under
color of state law, deprives or causes another person to be deprived of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
... .-9 The federal district courts have original jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3).10 The statute is designed to protect persons from
state officials whose abuses are made possible because they are clothed
with the authority of the state."
Although neither the statute nor the legislative history mentions
immunities,'12 courts generally have concluded that a literal application
of the statute would subject state officials to liability without fault, a
bizarre result that Congress could not have intended.13 Accordingly,
by employment or by appointment of the court, is not a State functionary, and his
actions are not State actions so as to bring him within the reach of section 1983 . .. .
Id. at 818. See cases cited note 42 infra and accompanying text.
8. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
11. The Supreme Court defined action taken "under color of" state law in United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945). In Classic the Supreme Court stated: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." 313 U.S. at 326. The Court
in Screws stated:
It is clear that under "color" of law means under "pretense" of law. Thus
acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded.
Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it. If, as suggested,
the statute was designed to embrace only action which the State in fact author-
ized, the words "under color of any law" were hardly apt words to express the
idea.
325 U.S. at 111. Both Classic and Screws dealt with 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), the crim-
inal counterpart of § 1983. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961), the
Supreme Court stated that the definitions given in Classic and Screws were applicable to
§ 1983.
12. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (remarks of Senator Edwards).
The legislative debates can also be found in A. AvINs, TnE RECONSmUCnON DEBATES
(1967), a collection of relevant portions of the congressional debates during the
Reconstruction period with cross references to official pagination in the CONORESSIONAL
GLOBE.
13. Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954); see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1966);
Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
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courts have largely incorporated the common law official immunity
from suit into section 1983.14 In confronting the question whether to
grant immunity to a particular official, courts consider the immunity
historically afforded the particular office,15 the interests behind the
immunity,"0 and whether section 1983 conflicts with those interestsY.
At common law, and consequently in section 1983 actions, courts
have developed two types of immunities-absolute and qualified.:'
Qualified immunity relieves state officials of liability if they act in good
faith and have reasonable grounds for believing their actions to be law-
ful.' The doctrine of qualified immunity is predicated on the need to
protect officials from time-consuming suits that deflect them from their
official duties, the need to encourage officials in the fearless use of dis-
cretion, and the need to recruit and retain able public servants.20
Absolute immunity shields the state official from any liability for all
acts within the scope of his official duties.2 1  Because a grant of
absolute immunity to all state officials would constitute judicial repeal of
section 1983,22 courts have allowed it only in special circumstances, and
until recently, only when "necessary to protect the decision-making
process in which the official is engaged." 23
At common law, judges were absolutely immune from damage suits
14. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967);
Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); C. AmirEAu, supra note 5, at §§ 40-42;
Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. R v. 615, 619-20 (1970); Comment, The Civil Rights Acts
and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALn'. L. REv. 145, 156-57, 160-61 (1961); 1971 WASH. U.L.Q.
666, 667-68.
15. See note 13 supra.
16. See, e.g., note 13 supra; notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. See David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. 127, 260,
368 (1939); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FoEDHAM L.
REV. 130 (1943).
19. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
20. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 271-
72 (1937); Keefe, supra note 18, at 131.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. See cases cited note 13 supra. The Supreme Court's awareness of this problem
is apparent from its approach to § 1983 immunities and its refusal to extend to an
official a greater immunity than he had at common law.
23. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 432 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judg-
ment).
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for action taken pursuant to their official duties.2 4  In Pierson v. Ray,2"
the Supreme Court extended absolute judicial immunity to section 1983
suits as well, reasoning that fear of damage suits would intimidate judges
and destroy the integrity of judicial decisions.2 At common law,
prosecutors also had absolute immunity from suits for malicious prose-
cution and defamation. 27 Such quasi-judicial immunity was designed to
ensure the vigorous and fearless exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
instituting criminal proceedings-a function essential to the judicial
process.2 s In the 1976 case of Imbler v. Pachtnan,0 the Supreme
Court held that section 1983 incorporated the common law immunity
for prosecutors initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case.8 0
In so doing, however, the Court departed significantly from the common
law rationale. Although relying in part on the need to protect prosecu-
torial discretion,81 the Court also stressed such factors as the prospect of
24. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
There are a plethora of cases holding judges absolutely immune. See Schwartz 'V.
Weinstein, 459 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1972); Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.
1970); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1961);
Larsen v. Gibson, 267 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 848 (1959); Kenney
v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Tate v. Arnold,
223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955). But see O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (judges
not immunized against criminal liability); Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 975 (1976) (judge liable for acting in clear absence of
his jurisdiction); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge not abso-
lutely immune when he physically attacked a citizen in courtroom); Littleton v. Berb-
ling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 143 (1974) (judge not
immune from injunctive actions under § 1983).
25. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
26. Id. at 554-55.
27. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), ajI'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); Smith
v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663 (1917); Semmes v. Collins, 120 Miss. 265, 82
So. 145 (1919). But see Leong Yan v. Carden, 23 Hawaii 362 (1916) (qualified
immunity).
28. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 399 (2d Cir.), afj'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); T.
COOLEY, A TREATsE ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 312 (4th ed. 1932).
29. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
30. Id. at 427-31; cf. Holton v. Bowman, 493 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1974) (immunity
does not extend to acts outside scope of prosecutorial duties); Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1973) (afforded no
greater immunity than police acting under his direction when participating in planning
and execution of illegal raid); Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 410-11 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143 (1974) (not immunized when he acts as a police
investigator); Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029
(1972) (immunity does not extend to deliberate suppression of evidence); Robichaud v,
Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-38 (9th Cir. 1965) (liable as a policeman if he acts as one).
31. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 421-26.
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hindering appellate review of criminal convictions, the desire to protect
innocent prosecutors from erroneous judgments, and the fear that appel-
late courts would not vigorously review criminal convictions if aware
that reversal might subject the prosecutor to civil liability. 2
A concurring opinion by Justice White sharply criticized the majori-
ty's consideration of these factors: such problems were relevant to
qualified immunity, but the only rationale for absolute immunity, ac-
cording to Justice White, was to avoid interference with the state offi-
cial's decisionmaking process.3"
The case law considering whether quasi-judicial immunity should
attach to appointed defense counsel is relatively sparse. Courts facing
this issue have no common-law tradition of immunity on which to rely
because at common law the state had no obligation to provide counsel to
criminal defendants.34 Consequently, any litigation between attorney
and client involved purely private parties, and the special immunities
granted to state officers were irrelevant. Once the state is required to
provide defense counsel to indigents, however, the attorney arguably
becomes an agent of the state,33 and the immunities attaching to state
officers must be considered.
The courts that have addressed the question have reached varying
conclusions on the appropriate rule. In Brown v. Joseph,36 the Third
Circuit granted absolute immunity to a state public defender sued under
section 1983. The court analogized the public defender's role to that of
a prosecutor, reasoned that defense counsel could not properly pursue
his trial strategy without absolute immunity, and noted that exposure to
damage suits could hinder recruitment of future public defenders. 37 On
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in John v. Hurt8 concurred in both
the analogy and the reasoning of Brown, but thought these factors
warranted only a grant of qualified immunity. 39 The court in United
32. Id. at 425.
33. Id. at 435-37.
34. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942).
35. But see cases cited note 42 infra and accompanying text.
36. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
37. Id. at 1047-49; accord, Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975).
38. 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 788; accord, Morrow v. Igleburger, 67 F.R.D. 675 (S.D. Ohio 1974); cf.
Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 464 & n.22 (9th Cir. 1976)
(court found that I.C.C. agents and Department of Justice attorneys acted in good faith
within the doctrine of qualified immunity and did not reach the issue of the availability
of absolute immunity).
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States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker40 took yet a third approach, reasoning
that defense counsel's duty was not essentially judicial and rejected the
analogy to the prosecutor. Consequently, the court thought the ration-
ale for judicial immunity inapplicable to the public defender and al-
lowed no immunity. 1 Several courts have avoided the issue entirely by
holding that court appointed counsel and public defenders do not act
under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under
section 1983.42
In Minns v. Paul,43 the Fourth Circuit assumed that appointed coun-
sel act under color of state law, and granted them absolute immunity
from suits under section 1983. The court followed Brown's legal
analysis, reasoning that because the court-appointed counsel's function is
similar to that of the public prosecutor, he should be entitled to the same
immunity from civil liability. 44 The court also relied on several policy
arguments to support an absolute rather than a qualified immunity. Of
primary concern was the need to encourage and protect the exercise of
professional judgment by court-appointed counsel-a particularly com-
pelling problem given that indigents, undeterred by personal expense, can
and do insist on instituting frivolous actions. 4r The court also recognized
the need to recruit and retain able lawyers to represent indigents.40
Finally, several civil and criminal remedies other than section 1983 are
available to protect the interests of the inmate whose court-appointed
counsel willfully deprives him of his constitutional rights. 47
The Minns holding is unwarranted by either its legal or policy ration-
ales. The court's legal analysis rested primarily on the immunity grant-
40. 335 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1971).
41. Id. at 45-46.
42. Dyer v. Rosenberg, 434 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1970); French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d
1211 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971); Hill v. Lewis, 361 F. Supp. 813
(E.D. Ark. 1973); cf. O'Brien v. Colbath, 465 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1972) (§ 1983 does
not authorize malpractice suits against court-appointed attorneys); United States ex rel.
Wood v. Blacker, 335 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1971) (no more reason for extending judicial
immunity to state public defenders than to court-appointed counsel). But cf. United
States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1974)
(indictment was sufficient to survive motion to dismiss; government allowed opportunity
to prove that defendant acted under color of state law in prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §
242 (1970)).
43. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 901-02; see notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
45. 542 F.2d at 901.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 902.
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ed to the prosecutor, whose role in the judicial system was thought to be
analogous to that of the court-appointed counsel. The two officials,
however, perform functions so different that the analogy is entirely
unsound. First, the decision to prosecute is a judicial one; the prosecu-
tor must weigh the evidence and determine the probable guilt or inno-
cence of the accused. Absolute immunity is appropriate to protect this
quasi-judicial decisionmaking process. The court-appointed counsel,
however, does not decide the guilt or innocence of his client, nor is he
authorized to decide the merits of his client's case.4 s Thus, Minns
extends judicial immunity to an officer who, if he acts in a judicial
capacity, does so wrongly. Second, the two officials are likely to react
to absolute immunity in different ways. Prosecutorial immunity from
damage suits by disgruntled defendants will encourage the prosecutor to
present the state's case forcefully and fully-it will improve his advoca-
cy. Immunizing court-appointed defense counsel from such suits may
produce precisely the opposite result. The malpractice action at common
law played an integral role in the maintenance and preservation of the
adversary system. The threat of tort liability serves not only to ensure
that clients receive zealous and diligent representation, but also to hold
the attorney to the required standard of care.4 By insulating court-ap-
pointed defense counsel from personal liability, the Minns court has
48. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1974). In Ellis v.
United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (per curiam); Suggs v. United States, 391 F.2d 971,
973 (D.C. Cir. 1968); and Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
the court stated that court-appointed counsel is not an amicus curiae but an advocate; he
may not brief the case against his client. The court may permit appointed counsel to
withdraw if satisfied that counsel has carefully investigated and found no nonfrivolous
issue.
49. See note 57 infra; Heffernan, Professional Malpractice Insurance: Let the
Attorney Beware, 48 CONN. B.J. 347, 350 (1947); Comment, Liability of Court-
Appointed Counsel for Malpractice in Federal Criminal Prosecution, 57 IowA L. REv.
1420, 1425 (1972).
The standard of care which an attorney is required to maintain is set forth in
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954):
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law and contracts
to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that 1)
he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to the
practice of his profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily pos-
sess; 2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation en-
trusted to him; and 3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and dili-
gence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his
client's case.
Id. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46 (citations omitted). See also ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1974).
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deprived the judicial system of the client's peculiar perspective, 0 neces-
sarily producing poorer legal representation for indigent defendants.
The court's policy analysis is equally deficient. The assertion that
counsel immune from suit could better screen out frivolous claims rests
on the unsound premise that the public defender owes primary alle-
gience to society. Although an agent of the state, a court-appointed
attorney's first loyalty is to his client, whom he should represent zealous-
ly and forthrightly. The Minns court's approach would convert the
defense counsel from zealous advocate to amicus curiae.51 Absolute
immunity for court-appointed counsel thus perverts rather than protects
their decisionmaking process.
The other rationales offered by the court at most justify a grant of
qualified immunity. As Justice White correctly observed in Imbler,
courts should only confer absolute immunity when necessary to protect
the decisionmaking function of the state official. 2 The remaining
interests underlying the common law's qualified immunities apply to
practically all state officials. The policeman,53 the governor, 1 the
mayor, 5" the municipal legislator, 66 and the private attorney 17 could
benefit equally from absolute immunity in civil actions. Each official
would be encouraged in the vigorous and fearless exercise of his discre-
tion; recruiting and retaining capable people for these offices would be
no problem; frivolous suits would be unheard of. Considering these
factors as a rationale for absolute immunity in every case could easily
50. The client is the closest person to his attorney, and is the most critical of his
attorney's work. He, in effect, sits as judge of his attorney.
51. See cases cited note 48 supra; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSTLITy EC
7-1 (1974).
52. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 432 (1976).
53. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (only entitled to a good faith defense).
54. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (entitled to a qualified immunity).
55. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 705 (5th
Cir. 1975) (mayor who urged police to "shoot to kill" liable to same extent as police
officer who shot plaintiff).
56. Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958) (only entitled to a qualified
immunity).
57. See Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882 (6th Cir. 1881); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1961); Gambert v.
Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872); Theoband v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864
(1961); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954); Holmes v. Peck, 1 R.I.
242 (1849); Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767); Russel v. Palmer, 95 Eng.
Rep. 837 (K.B. 1767); Baikie v. Chandless, 170 Eng. Rep. 1291 (Nisi Prius 1811). The
private attorney has neither a qualified nor an absolute immunity.
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immunize all state officials, effectively repealing section 1983.58 These
arguments warrant only a grant of the~imited good faith immunity that
attaches to most other state officials.
Even limited immunity may be unnecessary to protect the court-
appointed counsel who acts reasonably and in good faith. To state a
cause of action under section 1983, a complaint must allege a constitu-
tional violation. 9 An appointed counsel is liable only if his representa-
tion is so egregious that it deprives the indigent of his sixth amendment
right to counsel-mere allegations of tortious conduct do not suffice.60
The most lenient test of a sixth amendment violation is that the attorney
failed to act within the range of competence demanded of defense coun-
sel.6 ' A grant of limited immunity would not protect the court-appoint-
ed defense counsel whose conduct fell below this standard, because he
would have acted without reasonable grounds for believing his conduct
constitutional.62 Limited immunity therefore provides the defense at-
torney no greater protection than does the initial requirement that
plaintiff prove a constitutional violation.
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that court-appointed coun-
sel are not entitled to immunity under section 1983. The Minns court's
reliance on the analogy to the prosecutor is faulty; it extends quasi-
judicial immunity to an official who does not function in a quasi-judicial
capacity. - The danger inherent in the Minns approach is that it could
result in a broad grant of immunities that would effectively circumvent
the statute. 4  The irony of the Minns decision is that the grant of
absolute immunity to court-appointed defense counsel, ostensibly to
protect their indigent clients, defeats the purpose of the court-appointed
counsel and public defender systems.
58. See cases cited note 13 supra. The Supreme Court's awareness of this problem
is apparent from its approach to § 1983 immunities and in its refusal to extend to an
official a greater immunity than he had at common law.
59. See note 6 supra.
60. O'Brien v. Colbrath, 465 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, Smith v. Clapp,
436 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1970).
61. See United States v. De Coster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 1976
WASH. U.L.Q. 503, 509-13.
62. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
63. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
64. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
